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1. Introduction 
The consensus that institutions are a key determinant of economic development has led 
international organizations to devote attention and resources to improving the institutional 
frameworks of developing countries. Various conventions have accordingly been set up, such 
as the 1998 UN resolution or the 1999 OECD’s “Convention on combating bribery.” The 
political consensus is indeed backed by a parallel consensus based on results from a decade of 
empirical research. Spurred by the seminal papers of Mauro (1995) or Knack and 
Keefer (1995), this line of research has repeatedly concluded that ailing institutions are 
associated with lower GDP per capita growth. Later studies, such as Hall and Jones (1999) 
and Acemoglu et al. (2000), extended that finding to the level of per capita incomes. Hall and 
Jones (1999) furthermore observed that the bulk of the relationship between institutions and 
income runs through the impact of institutions on total factor productivity. 
Although those consonant observations have drawn a consistent picture of the 
relationship between institutions and development, they all share a common drawback that 
may turn out to be crucial in the context of developing economies in particular: they use 
official output figures. However, official output figures neglect a sizeable part of economic 
activity, which takes place in the informal sector and therefore remains unrecorded in official 
statistics, namely the shadow economy. According to Schneider (2005a, 2005b), who defines 
the shadow economy as currently unregistered economic activities that contribute to the 
officially calculated (or observed) Gross National Product, the shadow economy amounted on 
average to 39 percent in developing countries, and up to 40 percent in transition countries in 
2002/2003. Those figures consequently call for caution in interpreting empirical results 
emphasizing the negative impact of defective institutions on incomes. They in fact emphasize 
that official incomes decrease when, for instance, corruption increases or the rule of law 
deteriorates. They do not guarantee, however, that the same holds for total income, defined as 
the sum of official and unofficial incomes. 
Previous research moreover suggests that the shadow economy frolics in countries 
mired with defective institutions, thus acting as a substitute for the official economy. Johnson 
et al. (1997), for instance, model corruption to reduce the shadow economy because 
corruption works as a form of taxation and regulation, which drives entrepreneurs 
underground. Hindriks et al. (1999) also argue that the shadow economy is a complement to 
corruption. This is because, in their view, tax payers can collude with corrupt inspectors so 
that the latter underreport the tax liability of the tax payer in exchange for a bribe. According 
to the empirical results in Dreher and Schneider (2006), better institutions reduce the size of 
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the shadow economy. Similarly, Johnson et al. (1998a) observed a one-point increase in 
Transparency International’s corruption index to imply a 5.1 points fall in the share of the 
shadow economy. 
To summarize, good institutions seem to increase official output, while at the same 
time reducing unofficial output. One may accordingly contend that the observed correlation 
between bad institutions and lower income may be less substantial than it first seems. It may 
only result from a drop in recorded output. In other words, production might not disappear, it 
might only go underground, which is a special case of Hirschman (1970)’s exit option, as 
Schneider and Enste (2000) argue. Even if the substitution from official to shadow production 
would be imperfect, the negative impact of bad institutions on overall income would be 
dampened. This intuition is consistent with Johnson et al. (1998b), reporting the relationship 
between corruption and growth to become insignificant once the shadow economy is added as 
an explanatory variable. At any rate, a systematic investigation of the relationship between 
institutions and total income, as opposed to official income, is warranted. This is precisely the 
aim of this paper. 
To anticipate our main results, we confirm the positive impact of institutional quality 
on official output and total factor productivity, and its negative impact on the size of the 
underground economy reported in the previous literature. However, once output is corrected 
for the shadow economy, the relationship between institutions and output becomes weaker. 
The impact of institutions on total (“corrected”) factor productivity even becomes 
insignificant.  
Our line of reasoning is along the following steps. In a first section, we correct official 
output figures for the shadow economy. We then compare the distribution of per capita 
incomes using both raw and corrected figures. In a second section we probe deeper in the 
impact of the shadow economy on output by performing a development accounting analysis, 
following Hall and Jones (1999) and Caselli (2005). Namely, differences in incomes are 
broken down into differences in factor endowments and differences in total factor 
productivity. The next section uses that decomposition to determine the channels through 
which institutions affect income per capita. We thus check whether institutions are still 
significantly correlated with output per capita and total factor productivity once corrected for 
the size of the shadow economy. The last section concludes. 
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2. Correcting output figures 
The prerequisite to correcting output figures is to measure the shadow economy. Data for the 
shadow economy are taken from Schneider (2005a, 2005b).1 Schneider calculates the size and 
development of the shadow economy of 145 countries, including developing, transition, and 
highly developed OECD countries, over the period 1999 to 2003. In a first step 
Schneider (2005b) estimates the size of the shadow economy of 96 developing countries with 
the help of structural equation modeling (dynamic multiple causes, multiple indicators, 
DYMIMIC), employing variables such as direct and indirect taxation, custom duties, 
government regulations, the rate of unemployment, growth rate of real GDP, and currency 
circulation. The sample covers Central and South America, Africa, Asia and South-West-
Pacific Islands. Moreover, the data cover 25 Central and Eastern European Former Soviet 
Union countries, 3 Communist countries, and 21 high developed OECD countries. While the 
DYMIMIC approach produces estimated relative sizes of the shadow economy, another step 
is necessary to get to absolute values. In order to calibrate absolute figures of the size of the 
shadow economies from the relative DYMIMIC estimation results, Schneider uses previous 
estimates for a number of countries (e.g. Australia, Austria, Germany, Hungary, Italy, India, 
Peru, Russia and the United States).2 
According to these data, the average size of the shadow economy in percent of official 
GDP in 37 African states is 41 percent. In Central and South America the size of the shadow 
economy amounts to 41 percent. In Asia the average value is much lower (29 percent). 
Regarding the transition countries in the sample, the respective value is 38 percent, and for the 
OECD 17 percent. Looking at the unweighted average of the 145 countries in the sample, the 
average size of the shadow economy is 34 percent in 1999/2000.  
We added the shadow economy output to the official output figures, thereby obtaining 
what we refer to as total output. The data on official output stem from the Penn World Tables 
version 6.2. Table 1 below compares official (y) and total (ytot) output per worker measured in 
PPP dollars. We focus on the year 2000, because it maximizes the number of observations in 
our sample. We report data on two samples: First, we describe the largest sample for which 
we could find data on output per worker and the shadow economy, which features 136 
                                                 
1 We test for the robustness of our results by employing alternative estimates of the shadow economy below. 
2 These external estimates are derived employing the currency demand method. For the sources of these external 
estimates see Schneider (2005b, page 21). The most widely used methods to calculate the size of the shadow 
economy are described in Appendix E. For more details see Schneider (2007). 
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countries. Second, we use a restricted sample for which we could not only find data on output 
per worker and the shadow economy but also on human and physical capital stocks. 
 
 
 
Table 1: Distribution of official and total output 
 Largest sample Restricted sample 
 y ytot y ytot 
Mean 18940.73 23640.14 22834.13 27998.54 
Standard deviation 18995.49 21998.34 20338.46 23058.87 
Maximum/Minimum 75.83 59.46 38.50 31.14 
Number of countries 136 136 76 76 
y denotes official output per worker and ytot total output per worker defined as official 
output plus the shadow economy. 
 
As Table 1 shows, adding the output produced in the shadow economy to official 
output increases both the mean and the standard deviation of output. This is not surprising. 
Since the shadow economy can by definition not be negative, our correction can only increase 
output. However, Table 1 also reports the ratio of maximum to minimum output. This ratio 
decreases with the inclusion of the shadow economy to the output figures in both samples, 
which suggests that the distribution of outputs is more concentrated.  
This is due to the fact that the shadow economy tends to be larger in poorer countries. 
To be more specific, the coefficient of correlation between the share of the shadow economy 
and official output per worker is −0.67 in the larger sample and –0.71 in the restricted sample. 
Official figures therefore tend to overestimate the differences in output across countries. It is 
thus unsurprising that the observed differences in outputs are reduced when the shadow 
economy is taken into account. In the next section we investigate the impact of this correction 
on the results of development accounting. 
 
3. Development accounting with the shadow economy 
As official figures are biased downward in poorer countries, they may lead to underestimating 
these countries’ productivities. In this section, we therefore estimate productivities across 
countries with and without the shadow economy, and compare the results. To do so we first 
need to present the development accounting method and the data on which it was applied. 
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3.1. The development accounting method 
The basic aim of development accounting is estimating countries’ outputs as a function of 
their factor endowments and comparing the estimated figures with actual output figures. The 
difference between the two gives total factor productivity (TFP), or the Solow residual, 
depending on the reader’s optimism. 
To do so, the standard method in the literature is the calibration approach surveyed by 
Caselli (2005), and used by King and Levine (1994), Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1999), 
Prescott (1998) and Hall and Jones (1999), among others. According to that method, an 
aggregate production function of the following form is assumed: 
Y = AKα(Lh)1−α (1) 
where Y is the country’s output, and K its aggregate capital stock. L measures the 
country’s number of workers, and h is the average human capital stock. Lh is therefore a 
measure of the labor force adjusted for its quality; α is a parameter that measures the 
contribution of capital to output. A is total factor productivity. 
We rewrite the production function in per-worker terms, giving: 
y = Akαh1−α (2) 
where lower-case letters refer to per-worker variables. 
To compute A, one therefore needs a value for α and data on Y, K, L, and h. It is 
commonly assumed that a reasonable estimate for α is around 0.3, such as in Caselli (2005), 
Hall and Jones (2003), Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1999), Prescott (1998), or Collins et 
al. (1996).3 However, although this parameter’s value is critical in development accounting 
exercises, as Caselli (2005) shows, the specific value is admittedly arbitrary. True, it 
corresponds to the US long run average, but may be quite different for other countries. 
Indeed, the estimates of α that are reported in the literature do vary widely. Thus, Cavalcanti 
Ferreira et al. (2004) report estimates of α that are approximately equal to 0.43. Moreover, 
estimates of α obtained when the production function is estimated thanks to efficiency 
frontiers techniques frequently reach 0.8, as in Kneller and Stevens (2003). Abu-Qarn and 
Abu-Bader (2007) assess α in MENA countries and conclude that the share of capital often 
exceeds 0.6 in those countries. They even report estimates exceeding 0.9 for the region’s α. 
When studying OECD countries, Abu-Qarn and Abu-Bader (2007) also reject the 0.3 estimate 
and find that alpha robustly exceeds 0.5. However, the most systematic attempt at assessing 
                                                 
3 To be specific, Caselli (2005) and Hall and Jones (2003) precisely assume α = 0.3, whereas Prescott (1998) 
considers α = 0.25, and Collins et al. (1996) assume α = 0.35. 
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the share of capital in a large sample of countries is Senhadji’s (2000), providing estimates for 
a sample of 88 developed and developing countries. He also rejects the estimate of 0.3. He 
moreover observes large cross-country variations in that parameter. However, the world mean 
and the world median are found to be 0.55 and 0.57, respectively. 
As 0.3 therefore seems a very small value for α, and any exogenously imposed value 
is completely arbitrary, we endogenized the magnitude of that parameter, following various 
methods. Specifically, we first estimated the coefficient of the Cobb-Douglas production 
function given by (2) on our cross-country sample. This allowed us to use both official and 
total output. We then used the panel dimension of our data over the period 1980-2000.4 We 
first computed pooled and between regressions. We then ran a panel regression with fixed 
country effects and subsequently added fixed time effects. We also ran two random effect 
regressions, one including country effects only, and another including random time effects 
also. 
The results are displayed in the appendix. Although the estimates of α vary from one 
regression to another, they remain in a fairly narrow range of 0.5-0.6. They approximately 
average to 0.57, which corresponds to Senhadji’s (2000) estimate of the world median. We 
will therefore use that value in our calculations below. Note, however, that using the mean 
value of 0.55 obtained by Senhadji does not change our results. Arguably, an α  οf 0.57 
remains a conservative guess, as Senhadji (2000) reports estimates of alpha for individual 
countries or regions that often exceed it. This value of α allows investigating the impact of 
increasing the capital share in the production function, while leaving a role for differences in 
TFP in explaining cross-country differences in per worker output. As Caselli (2005) showed, 
variations in factor endowments explain the totality of cross-country differences in output per 
worker with values of α exceeding 0.6. However, we will test the robustness of our results by 
setting α  to 0.6 in the last section of this paper. We also employ the value of 0.3 as proposed 
in much of the earlier literature. 
The number of workers was computed from the Penn World Tables 6.2 dataset.5 The 
human capital stock is usually computed as a function of years of schooling in the population. 
Following Hall and Jones (1999) and Caselli (2005), we accordingly define h as: 
h = eφ(s) (3) 
                                                 
4 We restricted our observations to that period to minimize the impact of the initial capital stock. 
5 Specifically, the number of workers was obtained by dividing total GDP by GDP per worker, that is 
rgdpch*pop*1000/rgdpwok according to notations in the PWT6.2. 
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where s is the average number of years of schooling in the population over 25 years 
old in Barro and Lee’s (2001) dataset, and φ a piecewise linear function such that 
φ(s) = 0.134*s if s ≤ 4, φ(s) = 0.134*4 + 0.101*(s − 4) if 4 < s ≤ 8, and 
φ(s) = 0.134*4 + 0.101*4 + 0.068*(s − 8) if s > 8. Since Hall and Jones (1999), this definition 
of human capital is routinely used in development accounting. Its motivation is the following. 
According to our model, a worker’s wage should be proportional to the worker’s human 
capital. The relationship between wage and education is commonly assumed log-linear at the 
country-level, but the cross-country pattern of the education-wage profile seems convex. Hall 
and Jones (1999) therefore resorted to a piecewise linear specification to take stock of within 
and cross-country evidence. In Barro and Lee’s dataset, the last year for which this statistic is 
available is 2000. 
The last set of data required for our calculations is the stock of capital. We again 
followed the literature and computed it by applying the perpetual inventory method, where the 
capital stock of a particular year is defined as the sum of past investments to which a 
depreciation rate is applied. Hence, we assume that the capital stock is: 
Kt = Kt − 1*(1 – δ) + It − 1 (4) 
Again, data on real investment in PPP terms were obtained from the Penn World 
Tables 6.2.6 That data is available from 1950 until 2004. However, not all countries have 
complete series for the entire period. We therefore restricted our analysis to countries for 
which the information was available at least from 1970. 
To apply the above formula we, however, need the initial capital stock. Still following 
Caselli (2005) and Hall and Jones (1999), we assume that the capital stock in the initial year is 
equal to its steady-state value in the Solow growth model, namely K0 = I0 / (g + δ), where δ is 
the depreciation rate, which is usually set to 0.06 in the literature, I0 is the value of investment 
in the first year for which an observation is available, and g the average rate of growth for the 
investment series between that year and 1970.7 
Finally we used two definitions of output per worker. One was directly taken from the 
Penn World Tables 6.2 dataset.8 The other was corrected for the shadow economy, like in the 
previous section. Overall we could obtain data on output per worker, physical capital, human 
                                                 
6 That is rgdpl*pop*ki in PWT6.2. 
7 Note that the impact of K0 on the capital stocks in 2000 is quite small, as we use no base year subsequent to 
1970. Since the annual rate of depreciation is six percent, the maximum share of the initial capital stock still in 
use in 2000 cannot exceed 15% of its initial value. 
8 It is referred to as rgdpwok in PWT6.2. 
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capital, and the shadow economy for 76 countries in the year 2000. The key point now is to 
determine the extent to which the inclusion of the shadow economy in output figures affects 
the observed role of the residual in explaining cross-country income differences. Put 
differently, we aim at measuring the impact of that correction on the capacity of factor 
endowments to predict income differences.9 
To do so, we compare actual output per worker figures with output predicted by a 
model only considering factor endowments, that is yKH ≡ kαh1−α, called the factor-only model. 
We then assess its relevance by computing the two measures of success defined in 
Caselli (2005). The first one is the ratio of the log-variance of the factor-only output to the 
log-variance of observed output. As it is sensitive to outliers, it is complemented by the ratio 
of the 90th to the 10th percentile of the factor-only output to the ratio of the 90th to the 10th 
percentile of observed output. More precisely, those measures are defined as: 
( )[ ]
( )[ ]ylogvar
ylogvarsuccess KH1 ≡  (5a) 
1090
10
KH
90
KH
2 yy
yysuccess ≡   (5b) 
 
3.2. Results 
The two measures of success were computed once with official output figures and once with 
output figures corrected for the shadow economy. Table 2 below displays the results of our 
calculations: 
 
Table 2: Measures of success of the factor-only model 
 success1 success2 
Official output 0.571 0.705 
Total output 0.797 0.901 
 
The results displayed in table 2 are in line with the usual findings of the literature. 
Namely, it appears that the factor-only model fails to account for all the variance of output. 
However, the key finding of table 2 appears when comparing the results obtained with official 
                                                 
9 Note that we do not adjust input figures. The main reason for that is that we are not aware of estimates of the 
labor force and the capital stock in the shadow economy for a large enough sample of countries. We will, 
however, argue in the section on robustness checks that such correction would not greatly affect our results, and, 
if anything, would likely make them stronger. 
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figures to those obtained with corrected figures. We thus observe that the measures of success 
of the factor-only model are substantially greater when corrected figures are used instead of 
official figures. In our sample, the correction adds around twenty percentage points to those 
measures. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of implied productivity 
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
Max/Min 
A 2.559 0.699 4.708 
Atot 3.337 0.913 4.584 
 
A stands for TFP computed using official figures. Atot denotes TFP computed with figures corrected for 
the shadow economy. 
 
Table 3 above provides more information on the impact of adding the shadow 
economy to official output figures. The distribution of official TFPs is described in the first 
line and the distribution of corrected TFPs (including the shadow economy) in the following 
line. The results of table 3 are reminiscent of those in table 1. Namely, it appears that both the 
mean and the standard deviation of TFPs increase when the shadow economy is taken into 
account. However, the distribution of TFPs becomes more concentrated around its mean, as 
the drop in the ratio of maximum to minimum TFP suggests. Here again, the rationale for this 
result stems from the fact that a smaller share of output is officially reported in poorer 
countries. Their TFP therefore stands to be relatively more underestimated than that of richer 
countries. As a result, correcting for the shadow economy leads to a more concentrated 
distribution of TFP. 
 
Table 4: Productivity calculations: ratios to U.S. values 
Country y ytot A Atot 
USA 1 1 1 1 
Norway 0.953 1.044 0.859 0.941 
Singapore 0.876 0.911 0.854 0.889 
France 0.824 0.873 0.914 0.968 
Italy 0.758 0.886 0.915 1.070 
Hong-Kong 0.750 0.804 0.905 0.970 
Canada 0.743 0.793 0.823 0.878 
Great Britain 0.734 0.761 0.978 1.014 
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Japan 0.664 0.680 0.655 0.671 
Argentina 0.417 0.481 0.821 0.947 
Mexico 0.293 0.350 0.763 0.913 
Brazil 0.231 0.297 0.725 0.933 
Egypt 0.178 0.221 1.226 1.524 
Philippines 0.138 0.182 0.623 0.822 
China 0.100 0.103 0.510 0.529 
India 0.090 0.102 0.727 0.823 
Kenya 0.037 0.045 0.455 0.563 
Malawi 0.026 0.034 0.551 0.711 
Mean 0.340 0.384 0.765 0.918 
Correlation with y 1 0.995 0.435 0.140 
y denotes official output per worker and ytot total output per worker defined as official 
output plus the shadow economy. A stands for TFP computed using official figures. 
Atot denotes TFP computed with figures corrected for the shadow economy. 
 
To illustrate those results, table 4 picks some countries from the sample, and displays 
their official incomes, total incomes, and productivities. To facilitate comparisons, all values 
are given relative to the U.S., and countries are ranked by decreasing official GDP per worker. 
Table 4 also recalls summary statistics for the entire sample, and the correlation of each 
displayed variable with official output per worker. 
Table 4 confirms that productivity differences are responsible for the bulk of 
differences in output per worker. The same diagnosis can be made regardless of the definition 
of output, official or corrected, used for computations. Table 4, however, shows that the rise 
in output due to the inclusion of the shadow economy can indeed be quite large for some 
countries, and especially poorer ones. The result is that total productivity can be severely 
underestimated in countries with a large shadow sector. For instance, Malawi’s official 
productivity is 55.1% of the US. However, when corrected figures are used instead of official 
ones, Malawi’s TFP relative to the US increases by 20 percentage points. A similar order of 
magnitude can be found in a middle-income country like Brazil, where overall TFP exceeds 
official TFP by 20.8 percentage points relative to the US. Its GDP thus becomes 93.3% of the 
US instead of 72.5%. 
Even among developed countries can the inclusion of the shadow economy affect our 
perception of TFP differences, although its absolute increase remains smaller. Countries like 
Italy or Great Britain can thus make up all their difference vis-à-vis the US, as the upper half 
of table 4 shows. 
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More generally, all the variables displayed in table 4 appear to be positively correlated 
with official output per worker. Richer countries also tend to be more productive. More 
remarkable, however, is the fact that the correlation of TFP with output decreases when the 
shadow output is added to official output. The intuition of that finding is that the share of the 
shadow economy tends to increase when income decreases. Poorer countries therefore report 
a smaller fraction of their total output. This introduces a systematic bias that results in 
underestimating TFP in poor countries, which increases the correlation between output and 
TFP. When this statistical artifact is corrected, the correlation between output and TFP 
consequently becomes less clear. This is precisely what our calculations reveal. 
These results may cast some doubt on the usual finding that the quality of institutions 
is positively correlated with productivity, because the observed relationship may also be 
driven by unreported output. The next section investigates this possibility. 
 
4. Do institutions really affect output and productivity after all? 
Our chief measure of institutional quality is the rule of law, which has been an important 
focus of the literature on institutions and economic performance, such as Rodrik et al. (2004), 
or Dollar and Kraay (2003). It is measured by the World Bank’s rule of law index (Kaufman 
et al. 2006) for the year 2000. This index measures whether and to what extent institutions 
protect property rights, and reliably enforced laws and regulations govern economic and 
social interactions. It is based on perceptions recorded in a large number of independent polls 
and surveys. 
As a first step, we see whether we can replicate previous results on the impact of the 
rule of law on the underground economy with our sample. We chose a parsimonious model, 
including per capita GDP as the only additional explanatory variable. Table A1 in the 
appendix presents the results. As can be seen, GDP per capita does not affect the share of the 
underground economy at conventional levels of significance. The result, however, confirms 
previous research showing that institutions are negatively related to the shadow economy. At 
the one percent level of significance, a better rule of law reduces the share of the shadow 
economy. Specifically, an increase in the rule of law index by one point reduces the shadow 
economy by 0.3 percentage points.10 This amounts to a standardized beta coefficient of almost 
0.8. This result for 133 countries is in line with the models of Johnson et al. (1997) and 
Hindriks et al. (1999) and the results reported in Johnson et al. (1997, 1998b) showing that 
corruption affects the shadow economy positively in a cross section of 15 and, respectively, 
                                                 
10 This index is measured on a –2.5 to 2.5 scale. It ranges from –2.37 to 2.11 in our sample. 
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39 countries. We proceed by examining the impact of institutions on official and unofficial 
(logged) output per worker. 
 
Table 5: Institutions and output, year 2000 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Method OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Number of countries 133 133 124 124
Dependent variable Official output Total output Official output Total output
Rule of Law 0.93 0.86 1.31 1.23
(19.53)*** (17.93)*** (11.20)*** (10.66)***
R-squared 0.64 0.60 0.54 0.50
First-stage F-test 36.52 36.52
Sargan test (P-value) 0.14 0.11
 
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
Constant term included but not reported. 
 
Table 5 shows the results. Again, we follow Hall and Jones (1999) and opt for a 
parsimonious specification, including only the rule of law as explanatory variable. As Hall 
and Jones (1999) argue, social infrastructure, that is institutions, is the primary and 
fundamental determinant of output per worker. 
While column 1 refers to official GDP, column 2 employs corrected output figures, i.e. 
overall output including the shadow economy. Given the negative impact of the rule of law on 
the shadow economy (reproduced for our sample in table A1 in the appendix), we would 
expect the impact of the rule of law on output to be smaller or vanish completely once the 
underground economy is included. As can be seen, this is indeed what happens. The results 
show that the impact of the rule of law on total output is smaller than its impact on official 
output. Our results show that improvements in the rule of law still increase output when the 
shadow economy is taken into account – the positive impact on official GDP apparently 
dominates the negative impact on the size of the shadow economy. According to the 
coefficients, an increase in the rule of law index by one point increases official output by 9.3 
percent, while increasing total output by 8.6 percent only. With the rule of law index varying 
from -2.37 to 2.11 among the countries included in our sample, the difference between the 
parameters of the two models is non-negligible. It is significant at the one percent level. The 
standardized regression (beta) coefficients are 0.8 and 0.78, respectively. 
As one potential problem with the analysis, however, institutions might well depend 
on GDP and could as such be endogenous. To control for potential endogeneity bias, we 
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instrument the rule of law index employing the variables suggested in Hall and Jones (1999) 
as instruments for institutional quality. Their instruments measure the extent of Western 
influence in the sixteenth trough nineteenth century, being exogenous to GDP, but being 
highly correlated with institutions. According to Hall and Jones, European influence is 
unlikely to have been stronger in regions more likely to have higher GDP today. This is, first, 
because Europeans were conquering above all resource rich regions, which are not 
systematically among the countries with high output per worker today. Second, European 
influence concentrated on sparsely settled regions. As these frequently were regions with low 
productivity, there should again be no tendency for these regions to be among those with high 
output per worker today. 
Still, past European influence is likely to be highly correlated with the rule of law. As 
Hall and Jones (1999) point out, countries most strongly influenced by Western Europe are 
among those most likely to adopt favorable infrastructure. We employ the percentage of a 
country’s population speaking one of the five primary Western European languages as their 
mother tongue. In addition, we use the absolute value of a country’s latitude in degrees, 
measuring the distance from the equator.11 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 report the results of our instrumental variables approach. 
As shown in the table, the overidentifying restrictions are not rejected at conventional levels 
of significance. The instruments are jointly significant at the one percent level in both first-
stage regressions. In fact, the F-test statistic easily exceeds the rule-of-thumb threshold of 10 
proposed by Staiger and Stock (1997), indicating some power of the instruments. 
As can be seen, the impact of the rule of law on output remains significant at the one 
percent level in both specifications, with a positive coefficient. The coefficients show that an 
increase in the rule of law index by 0.01 increases official output by 13.1 percent, and total 
output by 12.3 percent. Again, the impact of the rule of law is thus smaller when focusing on 
total output as compared to official output. The difference in parameters of the two models is 
significant at the five percent level. 
 
                                                 
11 Hall and Jones provide two plausible motivations for this: First, Western European settlers were more likely to 
migrate to sparsely populated areas in the fifteenth century. Second, they were more likely to settle in regions 
with climate similar to Western Europe, which is true for regions far from the equator. 
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Table 6a: Institutions and Total Factor Productivity, 76 countries, year 2000 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Method OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Dependent variable Official TFP Total TFP Official TFP Total TFP
Rule of Law 0.25 0.07 0.24 0.04
(3.91)*** (0.83) (3.49)*** (0.38)
R-squared 0.15 0.01 0.15 0.01
First-stage F-test 116.55 116.55
Sargan test (P-value) 0.92 0.98
 
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
Constant term included but not reported. 
 
 
Table 6b: Institutions and Total Factor Productivity, 76 countries, year 2000 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Method OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Dependent variable Official TFP Total TFP Official TFP Total TFP
Rule of Law 0.24 0.05 0.22 -0.01
(2.80)*** (0.42) (2.24)** (0.10)
Government consumption -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 0.001
    (percent of GDP) (0.35) (0.25) (0.23) (0.04)
Inflation -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(2.44)** (2.32)** (2.51)** (2.48)**
R-squared 0.18 0.04 0.18 0.04
First-stage F-test 70.41 70.41
Sargan test (P-value) 0.86 0.97
 
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
Constant term included but not reported. 
 
Tables 6a and 6b focus on total factor productivity. When instrumenting institutional 
quality with latitude and the percentage of major European languages spoken, the Sargan test 
does reject the overidentifying restrictions, casting doubts on the exogeneity of the 
instruments. The analysis presented in the table therefore employs the share of native English 
speakers instead of focusing on five languages (as suggested by Hall and Jones 1999) and 
GDP per capita.  
It now appears that while the rule of law is highly correlated with per capita GDP, it is 
not significantly correlated with total factor productivity (0.84 and, respectively, 0.3). This 
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suggests that the impact of institutions on output runs mainly through factor endowments as 
opposed to productivity. While the results are not affected by the choice of instruments, the 
Sargan test does now not reject the overidentifying restrictions at conventional levels of 
significance. 
We present two sets of results. First, table 6a again employs a parsimonious model, 
including the rule of law index as the only explanatory variable. Second, in table 6b we 
additionally control for government consumption (in percent of GDP) and the rate of 
inflation. Both variables create distortions and can thus reasonably be expected to affect the 
relationship between the rule of law and factor productivity. 
According to the results of both specifications, the rule of law significantly increases 
total factor productivity when official output is concerned. However, turning to total output, 
this result no longer holds. According to the OLS and instrumental variables estimates, the 
impact of the rule of law on total factor productivity no longer exists once controlled for the 
shadow economy. This result has important implications for empirical research on the impact 
of institutional quality on productivity. While good institutions increase official output, they 
at the same time decrease the size of the underground economy. As a consequence, total 
factor productivity does not seem to be affected by the quality of institutions. Regarding the 
control variables, table 6b shows that government consumption does not affect factor 
productivity in any specification, while productivity declines with inflation, at the five percent 
level of significance. The first-stage F-test indicates some power of the instruments, while the 
Sargan test does not reject the overidentifying restrictions at conventional levels of 
significance. Overall, these results suggest a new implication of the results obtained for 
instance by Hall and Jones (1999) or Lambsdorff (2003). Their finding that the quality of 
institutions affects official productivity may indeed be driven by the fact that they used 
official figures, and therefore underestimated output. Consequently, their estimates may not 
only imply that some production disappears in weak institutional frameworks, but also that 
some production goes underground. 
Table 7 decomposes the effect of institutional quality on the components of total 
output. Total output being equal to official output plus the shadow economy, expression (2) 
implies that the sum of the coefficients of institutions that appear in columns (2) to (5) of table 
7 should equal the coefficient that appears in the first column.12  
 
                                                 
12 This comes from the definition of total output as ytot = (1+shadow)*y = (1+shadow)*ΑKαh1−α. 
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Table 7: Decomposing the impact of institutions on total output, 2SLS, 76 countries, 
year 2000 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable log y α log k (1-α) log h log tfp log (1+shadow)
Rule of Law 0.99 0.83 0.10 0.14 -0.09
(11.17)*** (9.85)*** (9.54)*** (3.32)*** (9.59)***
R-squared 0.64 0.63 0.60 0.16 0.54
First-stage F-test 42.16 42.16 42.16 42.16 42.16
Sargan test (P-value) 0.00 0.06 0.14 0.06 0.11
 
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
Constant term included but not reported. 
 
According to Table 7, total output increases with the rule of law at the one percent 
level of significance in the restricted sample of 76 countries, confirming the results of Table 5. 
The results also show that the impact of institutional quality on total output runs through its 
effect on physical capital, human capital, and TFP, but is partly compensated by its impact on 
the shadow economy. They, however, also imply that the by far biggest share of the impact of 
institutional quality on output is via the capital stock per worker. 
 
5. Further discussion and tests for robustness 
It may be argued that the concept of institutions is multifaceted, and that our results lack 
generality because we only focused on one indicator of institutional quality. As our first test 
of robustness, we therefore check whether our main results hold when using alternative 
indicators of institutional quality. We replicate the analyses displayed in tables 5 and 6a with 
alternative governance measures constructed by the World Bank (Kaufman et al., 2006). The 
World Bank’s control of corruption index is an aggregate measure of the extent of corruption 
(defined as the exercise of public power for private gain). Voice and accountability refers to 
the extent to which a country’s citizens can participate in selecting their governments, and to 
freedom of expression, association and the media. Political stability captures a population’s 
perception of its government’s stability. It is the perceived likelihood that the government 
could be overthrown by violent or unconstitutional means. Government effectiveness reflects 
the quality of the administration and of civil servants, and the credibility of a government. It 
focuses on inputs that governments need to produce and implement sound policies and deliver 
public goods. Regulatory quality measures the government’s ability to formulate and 
implement sound and market-friendly policies and regulations. 
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Table A2 in the appendix shows the impact of the additional five indicators of 
institutional quality on official and total output. According to all (OLS and 2SLS) regressions, 
institutional quality increases official and total output at the one percent level of significance. 
According to all regressions, moreover, the coefficients of the institutional variables become 
smaller when official output is corrected for the size of the shadow economy. In all 
regressions, the difference between the parameters of the two models is significant at the five 
percent level at least. 
Table A3 in the appendix shows how the choice of indicator affects the results for the 
impact of institutional quality on total factor productivity. As can be seen, the general picture 
is consistent with the results reported for the rule of law above. Focusing on the 2SLS results, 
better institutions increase official factor productivity in all regressions, at the one percent 
level of significance. Correcting for the size of the shadow economy, none of the coefficients 
remains significant at conventional levels. If one interprets those indicators as proxies for the 
same underlying phenomenon, one may conclude that our main results are robust to the 
choice of indicator of institutional quality. If one considers that those indicators measure 
different dimensions of the institutional framework,13 one may also consider the differences in 
the magnitudes of the coefficients. They suggest that it is the quality of the regulatory 
framework and the voice and accountability indicators that have the largest impact. 
One may also argue that the relationship may differ according to countries’ 
development, because they operate in different economic and political environments. Our 
second test thus consists in splitting the sample according to income. Our high-income sample 
contains countries with per capita GDP above 6000 US$, which is the average value among 
our sample of countries. The low-income sample includes those with values below 6000 US$. 
Tables A4 and A5 in the appendix show the results according to income groups. As 
can be seen in table A4, the results for the low-income group very much resemble those for 
the previous sample. Again, official and total output increase significantly with the rule of 
law; again, the coefficient declines in magnitude once accounted for the shadow economy. In 
the group of countries with high income, there is a substantial decline in the magnitude of the 
impact of the rule of law on output when we take account of the shadow economy. In the 
2SLS regressions, however, the impact of the rule of law is no longer significant at 
conventional levels. The small number of countries does not seem to allow the identification 
of a significant impact here. 
                                                 
13 See Bjørnskov (2006) for a discussion of whether and to what extent these indices can be separated 
statistically rather than representing the same underlying concept. 
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According to table A5, the previous results regarding total factor productivity hold for 
the sample of 50 low-income countries, while neither official nor total productivity are 
affected in the sample of 26 countries with above average per capita GDP. This suggests that 
the relationship that was previously observed was mainly driven by low-income countries. 
We also replicate the analysis of total factor productivity setting α to 0.6 and, 
respectively, 0.3, which can be considered as extreme values for the share of capital suggested 
in the previous literature. While it is well known that the results of development accounting 
severely depend on the choice of α, and we consider the mean value of 0.57 to be the 
appropriate one for our sample of countries, this provides an interesting test for the robustness 
of our results. 
Table A5 in the appendix shows that using a value of 0.6 confirms the results obtained 
previously. Employing a value of 0.3, the results also show that improving the rule of law 
significantly increases official productivity. However, the magnitude of the coefficient is 
significantly larger than with higher values of α. More to the point, and contrary to the results 
obtained above, productivity remains correlated with the rule of law, at the one percent level 
of significance even when the shadow economy is added to output. The rationale for this 
result is that decreasing α reduces the role of the physical capital stock in explaining TFP 
differences. As the variance of the physical capital stock is larger than the variance of the 
human capital stock, this leaves a larger fraction of the variation of output unexplained by 
factor endowments. Moreover, as table 7 shows, the impact of institutions on output mainly 
goes through its impact on capital. As a result, using a lower α increases not only the Solow 
residual but also its correlation with institutions. Unsurprisingly therefore, the regression’s R2 
when TFP is regressed on institutions is larger when α is 0.3. It simply reflects the fact that 
the impact of institutions on the capital stock is partly neglected when TFP is computed with a 
small α, which overstates the correlation between institutions and productivity. This result 
notwithstanding, one should, however, notice that the coefficient of the rule of law index 
diminishes when total output is used to compute TFP instead of official output. This therefore 
again suggests a substitution of shadow output to official output when the institutional 
framework deteriorates. 
The impact of not correcting input figures for the shadow economy also deserves some 
comments. This concern first hinges on labor figures. Following the rest of the development 
accounting literature, we proxy the labor force by the working age population. There is 
therefore no reason to correct those figures for the shadow economy, unless one suspects the 
existence of “shadow inhabitants.” Admittedly, the ideal concept of labor inputs would be the 
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number of hours worked. Unfortunately, figures on the number of worked hours are scarce, let 
alone figures on hours worked in the shadow economy. At the same time, with the limited 
data available, Caselli (2005) shows that taking into account differences in hours worked is 
unlikely to affect the outcome of development accounting analyses. Not adjusting labor inputs 
should therefore prove of little importance for our results. 
The same concern holds for the capital stock, which we do not correct for the shadow 
economy either.14 This concern deserves several comments. First, ever since the ILO’s (1972) 
seminal study of the informal sector, it has been stressed that small scale activities dominate 
that sector, at least in developing economies, and that it therefore generates low income and 
little accumulation, if any, as Gërxhani (2004) points out. Loayza (1996) even views the lack 
of capital as an intrinsic consequence of the nature of the informal sector: Since informal 
firms must avoid detection, and face prohibitive borrowing rates because they cannot sign 
formal contracts, the value of informal capital is inevitably limited. Furthermore, the capital 
stock used in the shadow economy might simply be that of the official sector. As Tanzi (1999) 
remarks, individuals who operate in the shadow economy often use capital or tools that are 
borrowed from the official economy. Hillman et al. (1995) back this claim with anecdotal 
evidence from Bulgaria. They report that formal state enterprises were rented out to informal 
entrepreneurs. This implies that there may be little capital specific to the shadow economy. 
This first remark notwithstanding, one may still worry that some unregistered capital 
operates in the shadow economy. As the shadow economy is larger in poorer countries, and in 
countries with poorer institutions, this may result in overestimating TFP in those countries. At 
the same time, as Pritchett (2003) argues, those countries are also those where public 
investment is the least efficient. Those countries moreover experience more frequent 
destructions due to natural disasters, as Caselli and Malhotra (2004) emphasize, and wars. The 
perpetual inventory method, which does not control for the efficiency of investment, and 
assumes a constant rate of depreciation across countries, thus overestimates poor and badly 
governed countries’ capital stocks, and underestimates their TFPs. Given the scale of public 
investments compared to the scale of activities in the shadow economy, one may contend that 
the latter effect is bound to dominate the former. Therefore, there are reasons to believe that 
                                                 
14 In fact, the appropriate measurement of the capital stock is a general preoccupation of the development 
accounting literature. 
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more accurate measures of the capital stock would further weaken the link between 
institutional quality and TFP, thus strengthening our findings.15 
Finally, it is important to test whether our results depend on how we measure the size 
of the shadow economy. While the data used here refer to a larger number of countries than 
any other available data and are consistently estimated employing the same method for all 
countries, other estimates are also available. As our final test for robustness, we replicate the 
analysis using five different sets of estimates for the shadow economy. Two indicators are 
taken from Friedman et al. (2000) who collected data on the unofficial economy for 69 
countries from various sources. The first indicator is also used in Johnson et al. (1998) and 
relies on three different sources.16 Their second set of estimates uses electricity-based 
estimates whenever available rather than the multiple causes, multiple indicators (MIMIC) 
and currency demand estimates.17 The remaining three sets of estimates are taken from 
Schneider and Enste (2000). First, we use average estimates for the years 1990-93 employing 
the physical input (electricity) method. Second, we use their MIMIC estimates over the same 
period of time. Our third indicator complements the first with data over the years 1989-90 
using the same method (taken from Johnson et al., 1997). 
Table A7 in the appendix reports the results for the impact of the rule of law on 
official and total output, while table A8 replicates the previous analysis for factor 
productivity. As can be seen, our previous results are confirmed to some extent. For samples 
varying between 33 and 69 countries, all estimates confirm the decline in the impact of the 
rule of law on output once corrected for the shadow economy. However, again, all estimates 
stay significant at the ten percent level at least. Turning to Total Factor Productivity, the OLS 
results confirm the results reported above. While official output rises significantly with a 
better rule of law, this relationship is no longer significant once the underground economy is 
accounted for. However, when estimated with 2SLS, the previous positive impact of the rule 
                                                 
15 One should also bear in mind that this concern only affects our findings on the relationship between TFP and 
institutions but not those on the relationship between output and institutions. 
16 Data for developed countries are calculated employing the currency demand method for the years 1990–1993. 
Data for transition countries use Johnson et al.’s (1997) estimates for 1995, while data for Latin America employ 
MIMIC estimates for 1990-1993 from Loayza (1996). Data for Asia and Africa are from Lacko (1996) and are 
based on the electricity method. See Appendix E for a short description of these methods and Schneider (2007) 
and Schneider and Enste (2000) for more details. 
17 More specifically, electricity-based estimates rather than MIMIC estimates are used for Latin America 
whenever available. For transition economies, 27 electricity-based estimates for the years 1990–1993 rather than 
for 1995 are used. Data for most developed countries are also calculated employing the electricity-based method 
(for the years 1989–1990). 
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of law no longer prevails. According to the results, the coefficients remain positive for official 
productivity, but turn negative for corrected productivity, which is again in line with our 
previous results. Due to the substantially reduced sample size, however, the coefficients are 
(in some cases marginally) insignificant. 
To summarize, our results are very robust regarding the indicator of institutional 
quality and how we measure the size of the shadow economy. In line with the previous 
literature, we find, however, that our main results to some extent depend on the choice of α, 
the contribution of capital to output. While our results hold when employing a reasonable 
upper bound of α of 0.6, they do not hold when setting α to 0.3, which is the long run average 
for the US (but clearly inappropriate as average value for the countries among our sample). 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we re-examined the nexus between output, productivity, and institutions, while 
taking account of the importance of the shadow economy across the world. With that end in 
view, we studied the distribution and institutional determinants of output and total factor 
productivity (TPF), and compared the results obtained with official output and total output, 
defined as the sum of output produced in the official and shadow economy. 
According to our results, the distribution of output becomes less dispersed when 
official output figures are corrected for the shadow economy. This is due to the fact that the 
share of unrecorded activity is larger in poorer countries. Those countries’ total production 
therefore tends to be underestimated by official figures. 
To check how the omission of the shadow economy from official output figures may 
bias productivity measures, we performed a development accounting analysis with both 
official and corrected output figures. Our results show that using official figures 
underestimates total factor productivity, especially in poor countries. Moreover, we observe 
that correcting output for the shadow economy leads to an increase in the predictive power of 
the factor-only model. Part of the puzzle of the limited ability of factor-endowments to 
explain cross-country differences in output per worker may thus be explained by the existence 
of the shadow economy. 
To move to a deeper level of explanation of differences in countries’ economic 
performance, we studied the impact of the quality of the institutional framework. While we 
could replicate the usual association of output and TFP with institutions when we used official 
figures, we obtained more qualified results once employing corrected output figures. Namely, 
although total output is significantly positively correlated with institutional quality, the 
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estimated impact of institutions is smaller than the one obtained with official output. Even 
more striking is the impact of our correction on the relationship between TFP and institutions. 
More specifically, even though we observe the usual positive correlation between TFP and 
institutional quality when output is measured by official figures, this correlation loses 
significance when corrected output is used instead. This finding survived a series of 
robustness checks. In the least, our result calls for a reinterpretation of earlier studies that have 
emphasized the relationship between measured TFP and institutional quality. Our results 
suggest that part of the observed relationship reported in the previous literature is not due to a 
reduction of output, but instead due to a switch to the informal sector. 
Our results have broad implications for the empirical literature on the determinants 
and consequences of GDP. Since the shadow economy tends to be higher in countries with 
lower official GDP, results employing uncorrected figures will reflect this bias. Whenever the 
interest of the researcher is on income, instead of official income, corrected figures should be 
used instead of the official ones. 
What our results underline at the same time is that development accounting is a 
powerful tool of analysis that still needs improvement. This paves the way for future exciting 
research that may still change our understanding of the determinants of countries’ relative 
economic performance around the world. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A: Regression results 
 
Table A1: Rule of Law and shadow economy, 133 countries, year 2000 
(1)
Official output p.c. (log) -0.03
(1.00)
Rule of Law -0.32
(7.86)***
R-squared 0.58  
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses; *** significant at 1%. 
Constant term included. 
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Table A2: Institutions and output, year 2000 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Method OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Number of countries 133 133 124 124
Dependent variable Official output Total output Official output Total output
Control of corruption 0.84 0.77 1.28 1.21
(17.28)*** (16.21)*** (9.74)*** (9.33)***
R-squared 0.57 0.54 0.40 0.35
First-stage F-test 32.32 32.32
Sargan test (P-value) 0.37 0.30
Voice and accountability 0.77 0.73 1.28 1.21
(10.46)*** (10.39)*** (10.81)*** (10.82)***
R-squared 0.38 0.38 0.21 0.21
First-stage F-test 52.48 52.48
Sargan test (P-value) 0.24 0.30
Political stability 0.79 0.73 1.38 1.30
(10.86)*** (10.42)*** (9.96)*** (9.72)***
R-squared 0.44 0.41 0.18 0.14
First-stage F-test 36.05 36.05
Sargan test (P-value) 0.55 0.47
Government effectiveness 0.90 0.82 1.34 1.26
(18.00)*** (16.69)*** (10.44)*** (9.97)***
R-squared 0.59 0.55 0.44 0.40
First-stage F-test 34.99 34.99
Sargan test (P-value) 0.57 0.47
Regulatory Quality 0.82 0.76 1.67 1.59
(7.76)*** (7.40)*** (9.47)*** (9.27)***
R-squared 0.40 0.38 0.12 0.09
First-stage F-test 25.79 25.79
Sargan test (P-value) 0.01 0.02
 
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses; *** significant at 1%. 
Constant term included but not reported. 
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Table A3: Institutions and Total Factor Productivity, 76 countries, year 2000 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Method OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Dependent variable Official TFP Total TFP Official TFP Total TFP
Control of corruption 0.23 0.08 0.23 0.03
(3.95)*** (0.99) (3.46)*** (0.38)
R-squared 0.14 0.01 0.14 0.01
First-stage F-test 79.06 79.06
Sargan test (P-value) 0.91 0.99
Voice and accountability 0.22 0.12 0.38 0.06
(2.52)** (1.01) (3.65)*** (0.39)
R-squared 0.08 0.01 0.17 0.01
First-stage F-test 28.64 28.64
Sargan test (P-value) 0.99 0.99
Political stability 0.20 0.06 0.32 0.05
(2.65)*** (0.55) (3.32)*** (0.37)
R-squared 0.08 0.00 0.05 0.00
First-stage F-test 28.98 28.98
Sargan test (P-value) 0.93 0.98
Government effectiveness 0.32 0.17 0.26 0.04
(5.17)*** (1.95)* (3.73)*** (0.39)
R-squared 0.22 0.04 0.22 0.02
First-stage F-test 65.34 65.34
Sargan test (P-value) 0.91 0.99
Regulatory Quality 0.36 0.26 0.38 0.06
(4.64)*** (2.37)** (3.65)*** (0.41)
R-squared 0.17 0.05 0.17 0.02
First-stage F-test 28.64 28.64
Sargan test (P-value) 0.63 0.99
 
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
Constant term included but not reported. 
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Table A4: Institutions and Output by income, year 2000 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Method OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Dependent variable Official output Total output Official output Total output
Low income countries
Rule of Law 0.82 0.76 2.61 2.54
(8.20)*** (7.55)*** (3.85)*** (3.77)***
Number of countries 101 101 93 93
R-squared 0.28 0.25 . .
First-stage F-test 7.63 7.63
Sargan test (P-value) 0.07 0.05
High income countries
Rule of Law 0.28 0.19 0.00 -0.04
(3.57)*** (2.88)*** (0.02) (0.27)
Number of countries 32 32 31 31
R-squared 0.38 0.26 . .
First-stage F-test 2.24 2.24
Sargan test (P-value) 0.32 0.20
 
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses; *** significant at 1%. 
Constant term included but not reported. 
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Table A5: Institutions and Total Factor Productivity by income, year 2000 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Method OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Dependent variable Official TFP Total TFP Official TFP Total TFP
Low income countries
Rule of Law 0.40 0.35 0.68 0.62
(1.81)* (1.18) (2.34)** (1.55)
Number of countries 50 50 50 50
R-squared 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.01
First-stage F-test 10.13 10.13
Sargan test (P-value) 0.38 0.26
High income countries
Rule of Law 0.07 -0.13 0.17 -0.11
(0.57) (1.35) (0.84) (0.83)
Number of countries 26 26 26 26
R-squared 0.01 0.05 0.05
First-stage F-test 12.58 12.58
Sargan test (P-value) 0.20 0.24
 
 
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%. 
Constant term included but not reported. 
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Table A6: Rule of Law and Total Factor Productivity by α, 76 countries, year 2000 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Method OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Dependent variable Official TFP Total TFP Official TFP Total TFP
α=0.6
Rule of Law 0.11 -0.02 0.10 -0.05
(2.61)** (0.28) (2.19)** (0.79)
R-squared 0.07 0.00 0.07 .
First-stage F-test 116.55 116.55
Sargan test (P-value) 0.90 0.96
α=0.3
Rule of Law 32.27 31.02 34.42 32.57
(11.45)*** (8.49)*** (11.18)*** (8.33)***
R-squared 0.62 0.46 0.62 0.46
First-stage F-test 116.55 116.55
Sargan test (P-value) 0.72 0.63
 
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
Constant term included but not reported. 
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Table A7: Rule of Law and Output, different estimates for shadow economy 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Method OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Dependent variable Official output Total output Official output Total output
Friedman et al. (2000) set 1 0.67 0.58 0.89 0.73
(13.23)*** (12.49)*** (5.34)*** (4.47)***
R-squared 0.71 0.67 0.67 0.64
Number of countries 69 69 65 65
First-stage F-test 9.35 9.35
Sargan test (P-value) 0.18 0.20
Friedman et al. (2000) set 2 0.67 0.61 0.89 0.76
(13.23)*** (13.32)*** (5.34)*** (4.70)***
R-squared 0.71 0.70 0.67 0.68
Number of countries 69 69 65 65
First-stage F-test 9.35 9.35
Sargan test (P-value) 0.13 0.20
Physical input method 0.71 0.62 0.79 0.69
(10.89)*** (10.22)*** (7.58)*** (6.81)***
R-squared 0.71 0.66 0.70 0.65
Number of countries 54 54 54 54
First-stage F-test 32.49 32.49
Sargan test (P-value) 0.07 0.05
MIMIC 0.74 0.65 0.56 0.46
(6.87)*** (6.66)*** (2.25)** (1.91)*
R-squared 0.49 0.44 0.46 0.40
Number of countries 33 33 33 33
First-stage F-test 3.65 3.65
Sargan test (P-value) 0.02 0.01
Physical input method (extended) 0.67 0.62 0.90 0.76
(14.13)*** (14.21)*** (5.66)*** (4.99)***
R-squared 0.71 0.69 0.65 0.66
Number of countries 75 75 68 68
First-stage F-test 10.28 10.28
Sargan test (P-value) 0.08 0.24
 
 
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
Constant term included but not reported. 
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Table A8: Rule of Law and Total Factor Productivity, different estimates for shadow 
economy  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Method OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Dependent variable Official TFP Total TFP Official TFP Total TFP
Friedman et al. (2000) set 1 0.20 -0.12 0.14 -0.25
(2.27)** (0.90) (1.24) (1.65)
R-squared 0.09 0.02 0.08
Number of countries 45 45 45 45
First-stage F-test 53.11 53.11
Sargan test (P-value) 0.36 0.51
Friedman et al. (2000) set 2 0.20 -0.06 0.14 -0.19
(2.27)** (0.38) (1.24) (1.14)
R-squared 0.09 0.00 0.08
Number of countries 45 45 45 45
First-stage F-test 53.11 53.11
Sargan test (P-value) 0.48 0.36
Physical input method 0.16 -0.13 0.12 -0.22
(1.83)* (0.91) (1.09) (1.38)
R-squared 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.01
Number of countries 47 47 47 47
First-stage F-test 53.50 53.50
Sargan test (P-value) 0.36 0.32
MIMIC 0.35 0.14 0.22 -0.11
(1.95)* (0.58) (1.42) (0.48)
R-squared 0.11 0.01 0.10
Number of countries 27 27 27 27
First-stage F-test 10.77 10.77
Sargan test (P-value) 0.68 0.58
Physical input method (extended) 0.19 -0.08 0.13 -0.19
(2.11)** (0.59) (1.26) (1.21)
R-squared 0.08 0.01 0.07
Number of countries 48 48 48 48
First-stage F-test 54.64 54.64
Sargan test (P-value) 0.66 0.54
  
 
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%. 
Constant term included but not reported. 
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Appendix B: Sources and Definitions 
 
Variable Description Source
Official output per worker (y ) Official output per worker measured in PPP dollars. Penn World Tables version 6.2
Shadow economy (shadow ) Size of the shadow economy in percent of official GDP. Schneider (2005)
Total output per worker (y tot ) Official output corrected for the share of the shadow economy.
Number of workers (L ) Computed as rgdpch*pop∗1000/rgdpwok. Penn World Tables version 6.2
Investment (I ) Computed as rgdpl*pop*ki. Penn World Tables version 6.2
Initial capital stock (K 0 ) Estimated as K 0 =I 0 /(g  + δ ) . Penn World Tables version 6.2
Capital stock (K ) Computed as K t =K t-1 *(1– δ )+I t-1 .
Schooling (s ) Average number of years of schooling in the population over 25 years old Barro and Lee (2001)
Human capital (h ) Defined as h  = e φ (s)  where φ  is a piecewise linear function.
Latitude Distance in degrees from the equator. Easterly and Sewadeh (2001)
Language
Percentage of the population speaking one of the five primary European 
languages: Portuguese, Spanish, English, French, German. Alesina et al. (2003)
Rule of Law
Perceptions based index, with higher numbers showing "better" 
environments. Kaufman et al. (2006)
Corruption
Perceptions based index, with higher numbers showing "better" 
environments. Kaufman et al. (2006)
Government Effectiveness
Perceptions based index, with higher numbers showing "better" 
environments. Kaufman et al. (2006)
Quality of bureaucracy
Perceptions based index, with higher numbers showing "better" 
environments. Kaufman et al. (2006)
Voice and Accountability
Perceptions based index, with higher numbers showing "better" 
environments. Kaufman et al. (2006)
GDP per capita GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$). World Bank (2006)
Government consumption General government final consumption expenditure in percent of GDP. World Bank (2006)
Inflation Inflation, consumer prices (annual percent) World Bank (2006)  
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Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation
Official output per worker (log) 9.34 6.79 11.65 1.17
Shadow economy (percent) 33.46 8.60 67.10 12.87
Total output per worker (log) 9.57 7.18 11.26 1.09
Number of workers 16800000 29751 755000000 68000000
Capital stock 83000000000000 117000000000 2030000000000000 252000000000000
Investment 5140000000000 305000000 236000000000000 21700000000000
Schooling 6.18 1.00 12.00 2.91
Human capital stock 2.15 1.11 3.42 0.59
Latitude 17.58 -36.89 64.22 23.70
Language (five primary) 22.85 0.00 100.00 38.59
Language (English) 9.17 0.00 100.00 26.49
Rule of Law -0.09 2.37 2.11 -0.99
Corruption -0.07 2.13 2.49 -1.00
Government Effectiveness -0.05 2.34 2.33 -1.00
Political stability -0.20 -2.93 1.52 1.01
Voice and Accountability -0.06 2.24 1.52 -1.01
GDP per capita 6001 86 44758 9043
Government consumption 16.42 3.83 63.78 7.71
Inflation 13.25 3.85 550.01 -52.26  
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Appendix D: Estimations of the production function 
 
Table D1: Cross-section estimates of the production function (2000) 
 Sample Dependent k h Int.  
1.1 Whole 
sample y 
0.63287 
(24.18) 
*** 
0.36713 
(14.03) 
*** 
0.02779 
(0.08) 
 
N=76 
F=980.11*** 
Adj.R2=0.9289
1.2 Whole 
sample ytot 
0.58227 
(22.58) 
*** 
0.41773 
(16.20) 
*** 
0.99568 
(2.78) 
*** 
N=76 
F=886.09*** 
Adj.R2=0.9219
1.3 Developing 
countries y 
0.57484 
(12.62) 
*** 
0.42516 
(9.33) 
*** 
0.76281 
(1.27) 
N=53 
F=275.30** 
Adj.R2=0.8406
1.4 Developing 
countries ytot 
0.55747 
(12.21) 
*** 
0.44253 
(9.69) 
*** 
1.30911 
(2.17) 
** 
N=53 
F=260.82*** 
Adj.R2=0.8364
1.5 Developed 
countries y 
0.51573 
(4.24) 
0.48427 
(3.98) 
1.89131 
(1.01) 
N=23 
F=20.42*** 
Adj.R2=0.4689
1.6 Developed 
countries ytot 
0.47065 
(3.60) 
*** 
0.52935 
(4.05) 
*** 
2.73685 
(1.37) 
 
N=23 
F=8.38*** 
Adj.R2=0.2511
 
Robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
We first estimated expression (2) on the cross-country sample that we use for development 
accounting. We first used official output then total output in our computations. We then split 
our sample between developing and developed countries according to the World Bank 
definition and ran our estimation anew. The results are displayed in table D1, in the fourth 
column of which the estimated value of is reported. Our estimates show that the share of 
capital is slightly below average in developed countries, but its estimate remains greater than 
0.3. The average estimated coefficient in table D1 is α ≅ 0.56. 
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Table D2: Panel estimates of the production function (1980-2000) 
 Sample Method k h Int.  
2.1 Whole sample Pooled 
0.608 
(50.00) 
*** 
0.392 
(32.30 
*** 
0.401 
(2.38) 
** 
N=79 
R2=0.9172 
 
2.2 Whole sample Between 
0.609 
(23.70) 
*** 
0.391 
(15.19 
*** 
0.376 
(1.06) 
N=79 
R2=0.9270 
 
2.3 Whole sample 
Fixed country 
effects 
0.525 
(14.93) 
*** 
0.475 
(13.53 
*** 
 N=79 
R2=0.9889 
F=25.86 
2.4 Whole sample 
Fixed country and 
time effects 
0.543 
(15.73) 
*** 
0.457 
(13.23 
*** 
 N=79 
R2=0.9896 
F=26.32 
2.5 Whole sample 
Random country 
effects 
0.578 
(27.13) 
*** 
0.422 
(19.82 
*** 
0.811 
(2.74) 
*** 
N=79 
R2=0.7467 
M=3.63 
2.6 Whole sample 
Random country 
and time effects 
0.584 
(27.95) 
*** 
0.416 
(19.94 
*** 
0.731 
(2.51) 
** 
N=79 
R2=0.7457 
M=2.17 
 
Robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Fixed 
effects are not reported. 
 
Table D2 displays the results of our panel estimations. They were run on a sample of 79 
countries and five years (1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000) for which we have data on both 
human and physical capital stocks. As the shadow economy data do not go sufficiently back 
in time, we had to focus on official output in our computations. F-tests support the existence 
of country-specific effects while Hausman tests accept the random one-way model, but 
marginally reject the random effect model. However the estimated values of α display little 
variation across estimations. The mean value of that parameter is α ≅ 0.57. 
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Appendix E: Methods to Estimate the Size of the Shadow Economy 
The Currency Demand Approach 
The currency demand approach employs a currency demand function to calculate the shadow 
economy. It is assumed that shadow transactions are undertaken in the form of cash payments, 
so as to leave no observable traces for the authorities. An increase in the size of the shadow 
economy will therefore increase the demand for currency. To isolate the resulting "excess" 
demand for currency, an equation for currency demand is estimated, controlling for variables 
like the development of income, payment habits, and interest rates, among others. 
Additionally, variables as direct and indirect tax burden, government regulation and the 
complexity of the tax system – which are assumed to be among the major factors causing 
people to work in the shadow economy – are included in the estimation equation. Any 
"excess" increase in currency, or the amount unexplained by the conventional or normal 
factors is then attributed to the shadow economy. 
 
The Physical Input (Electricity Consumption) Method 
This approach takes electric-power consumption as physical indicator of overall (or official 
plus unofficial) economic activity. Overall economic activity and electricity consumption 
have been empirically observed to move in lockstep, with an electricity to GDP elasticity 
usually close to one. This means that the growth of total electricity consumption is an 
indicator for growth of overall GDP. Subtracting the estimates of official GDP from this 
overall measure, unofficial GDP can be derived.  
 
The Model Approach  
The empirical method is based on the statistical theory of unobserved variables, which 
considers multiple causes and multiple indicators of the phenomenon to be measured. For the 
estimation, a factor-analytic approach is used to measure the hidden economy as an 
unobserved variable over time. The unknown coefficients are estimated in a set of structural 
equations within which the "unobserved" variable cannot be measured directly. The 
(DY)MIMIC – (dynamic) multiple-indicators multiple-causes – model consists in general of 
two parts, with the measurement model linking the unobserved variables to observed 
indicators.) The structural equations model specifies causal relationships among the 
unobserved variables. In this case, there is one unobserved variable – the size of the shadow 
economy – which is assumed to be influenced by a set of causes and indicators for the shadow 
economy’s size.  
